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CONTRACTS
I. RECISSION OF PERSONAL INJURY RELEASE
Remarkably, especially in view of the volume of motor
vehicle collision litigation, Herndon v. Wright' was the first
case to reach the Supreme Court of South Carolina impugning
a personal injury release on the ground of mistake since the
invention of the automobile. The plaintiff prosecuted this ap-
peal from an order sustaining the defendant's demurrer to
his second cause of action. This division of the complaint
sought recission of the release on the ground of mutual mis-
take in that both the appellant and the respondent's agent
had acted under the mistaken belief that the appellant's in-
juries were relatively minor as described by the attending
physician. Soon after the release was executed, serious and
disabling back injuries were discovered, to the effect that if
such had been known, the release would not have been given.
The court opined that these allegations, assumed to be
true for purposes of the demurrer, were sufficient to state a
cause of action. Its holding rested on the doctrine that a con-
tract may be rescinded if it "was executed as a result of a
mutual mistake of the contracting parties with reference to
a material matter, and . . . the agreement would not have
been entered into except for that mutual mistake .... ,,2
Lawton v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 3 upon which the circuit
judge had relied, was distinguishable on its facts in that it
dealt with a unilateral mistake by the party granting the
release.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS
The issue in two cases decided by the supreme court
during this survey period focused upon the construction of
the contract involved therein. In Derrick, Stubbs & Stith v.
Rogers4 a partnership engaged in the practice of public ac-
1. 257 S.C. 98, 184 S.E2d 444 (1971).
2. Id. at 103-04, 184 S.E2d at 446, citing Blassingame v. Greenville County,
134 S.C. 324, 132 S.E. 616 (1926); jumper v. Queen Mab Lumber Co., 115
S.C. 452, 106 S.E. 473 (1921).
3. 91 S.C. 332, 74 S.E. 750 (1912).
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counting sought to enforce a covenant-not-to-compete provi-
sion contained in its partnership agreement against a former
partner. The circuit court had sustained the defendant's de-
murrer to the complaint on the ground that no cause of action
was stated, and the partnership appealed. Its complaint,
which incorporated the entire partnership agreement, 5 alleged
that Rogers was involuntarily withdrawn from the partner-
ship by the action of the other partners. It further alleged
that the respondent had violated Section 17.02 in that he had
practiced public accounting within the prohibited geograph-
ical area prior to the expiration of three years from the date
of withdrawal.
In affirming the circuit judge's ruling, the supreme
court held that "expulsion is not compatible with the type of
withdrawal contemplated by the wording of Section 17 be-
cause such withdrawal connotes action on the part of the part-
ner. Expulsion, on the other hand, contemplates action taken
against the will of the affected party."0 It was significant
that the only reference to the covenant-not-to-compete provi-
sion was found in the section covering voluntary withdrawal,
and that there was no mention of involuntary withdrawal in
the disputed provision. The court further noted that its hold-
ing in Oxman v. Sherman7 would require that an ambiguity,
5. The relevant portions of the contract were as follows:
12. VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL
12.01 Any partner shall have the right to withdraw from the partner-
ship at the end of any fiscal year provided written notice of intention to
withdraw shall be delivered to the partners . . . See Section 17.
13. INVOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL
13.01 A partner who conducts himself in such a way as to jeopardize
the reputation of the partnership . . . shall thereby make himself liable
for expulsion from the partnership . . . . Expulsion may be ordered
only by unanimous agreement by all the other active partners.
17. GENERAL GROUND-RULES FOR SETTLING A PARTNER'S CAPITAL
ACCOUNT
17.02 A partner withdrawing or retiring from the partnership agrees
that, if the partnership continues its practice of public accountancy, he
will not engage in the practice of public accounting either, in a self-
employed capacity or as an employee within a radius of [60] miles of
the State House in Columbia, S. C. for a period of [3] years from the
date of withdrawal.
6. 256 S.C. at 399, 182 S.E.2d at 726.
7. 239 S.C. 218, 122 S.E2d 559 (1961).
Vol. 241
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CONTRACTS SURVEYED
if any existed, be construed against the applicability of a
covenant-not-to-compete.
In Lewis v. Carnaggio8 the plaintiff had constructed a
residence for the defendants under a written contract which
provided that the defendants were not required to pay "any
amount in excess of the sum of [$34,500.00] which is the esti-
mated cost of construction, plus the fee provided for herein."'
The defendant had successfully contended in the trial court
that the total amount due, including the contractor's fee,
could not under any circumstances exceed $34,500.00. In re-
versing and remanding the case the supreme court held that
punctuation is controlling in the construction of a contract
which is unambiguous and whose meaning is clear when read
as punctuated.
III. FRAUD
Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis'0 was an action in claim and
delivery instituted by the assignee of a conditional sales con-
tract to recover possession of a mobile home because of alleged
default in payments due under the contract. The defendant
counterclaimed that the contract had been fraudulently pro-
cured in that the seller-assignor had misrepresented to her
that she could assume the balance of $3,100 owed by a pre-
vious purchaser from whom the mobile home had been repos-
sessed. She alleged that she had executed the contract in blank,
into which the purchase price of $5,301.50 had been subse-
quently inserted by the seller-assignor.
In affirming the lower court's determination in favor of
Mrs. Lollis, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that both
the question of fraud and the question of whether she had
been negligent in signing a blank contract were properly sub-
mitted to the jury. In reply to Allen-Parker's contention that
the admission of testimony concerning the oral agreements
between the parties prior to the written contract violated the
parol evidence rule, the court relied upon the well-established
principle that parol evidence is competent to prove the facts
which constitute the fraud alleged, notwithstanding the fact
that the written contract stated that it contained all of the
provisions agreed upon. While the court recognized a duty
8. 257 S.C. 54, 183 S.E.2d 899 (1971).
9. Id. at 56, 183 S.E.2d at 900.
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on the part of a defrauded party to exercise reasonable care
to protect himself, it stated:
Where a person is induced to sign an instrument as a result of a false
representation that it will be filled in or prepared as orally agreed
upon, the intentional omission of terms required by the authorization
to be included, or the inclusion of terms not so authorized, constitute
fraud, invalidating the instrument as between the parties thereto, not-
withstanding that the person signing it was negligent in relying on
the misrepresentation.'1
In Dailey Co. v. American Institute of Marketing Sys-
tems, Inc.12 the plaintiff, a real estate company, brought an
action for fraud and deceit against a Missouri corporation
which had contracted to provide the former with advertising
and promotion material, referrals, and training of Dailey's
personnel. The supreme court found that there was not suffi-
cient evidence to support the lower court's verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. There was no indication that the defendant
entered into the contract without the intention to perform its
part of the bargain. Instead, the plaintiff's testimony was
directed entirely to the mere failure of the defendant to per-
form its contractual obligation which, even if sustained, would
not constitute fraud.
IV. APPLICABLE STATUTES
The distinction between a holdover tenant and a tenant
at will was examined by the supreme court in Townsend v.
Singleton.13 The appellant had leased certain premises from
the respondents pursuant to a written lease agreement at a
rental of $150 per month. This arrangement expired on Feb-
ruary 1, 1969; thereafter, the parties orally agreed to extend
the contract for one month. Although no new contract was
ever reached, the appellant continued to occupy the property
until November, 1969. The circuit court had concluded that
the appellant was a holdover tenant under the same terms and
-conditions as were contained in the written agreement.
On the basis of Section 41-1 et seq. of the Code, 14 the
11. Id. at 276, 185 S.E.2d at 744.
12. 256 S.C. 550, 183 S.E.2d 444 (1971).
13. 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. §41-1(3) (1962) provides:
Every person other than the owner of real estate . . . using or
occupying real estate without an agreement, either oral or in
[Vol. 24
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss4/3
CONTRACTS SURVEYED
court reversed and remanded the case, holding that after the
termination of the oral agreement on March 1, the appellant
was clearly a tenant at will and as such was liable only for a
reasonable rental for the premises. It further held that the
trial judge was in error in awarding attorney's fees to the
respondents because "recoverable damages do not include the
expense of employing counsel except when so provided for
by contract or statute."'r
Minter v. State Department of Mental Health' was in-
stituted by the administrator to determine the validity of the
State's claim against his intestate mother's estate. In 1956
the intestate's husband had entered into a contract with the
department to pay for the care and maintenance of his wife
at the rate of $7.00 per month, which he told the department
he could pay, instead of the established monthly charge of
$60.00. Prior thereto the intestate had been supported solely
at State expense for almost twenty years.
Finding it unnecessary to determine the validity of the
alleged contract since the balance due the State would exhaust
the estate, the supreme court held that under Section 32-1028
of the Code, 1'7 the contract could apply only to the intestate's
writing, shall be deemed a "tenant at will."
S.C. CODE ANN. §41-54 (1962) provides:
When a person enters upon or uses the premises of another
without agreement or without the permission of the owner or by
trespass the owner may at his option waive such tort and treat
and deem such person a tenant at will. In such case the land-
lord shall have and be entitled to a reasonable rental for the use
and occupation of such premises and all remedies for the en-
forcement of his rights in respect thereto as in other cases of
tenancy at will (emphasis added).
S.C. CODE ANN. §41-62 (1962) provides:
When there is an express agreement, either oral or written, as
to the term of the tenancy for term or for years such tenancy
shall end without notice upon the last day of the agreed term.
15. 257 S.C. at 12, 183 S.E.2d at 898, citing Rimer v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742 (1966) ; United States Rubber Co.
v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956); First Nat'l Bank v.
McSwain, 93 S.C. 30, 75 S.E. 1106 (1912).
16. 187 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 1972).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. §32-1028 (1962) provides:
The Commission shall make investigations and ascertain which
of the patients or trainees of State mental health facilities or
which of the parents, guardians, trustees, committees or other
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present and future needs. "There is nothing in the letters
between the parties from which it can be concluded that such
had any reference to the amount due and owing for past sup-
port and maintenance existing at the date of the making of
the alleged contract."' 8 The court further concluded that the
State had a valid and subsisting claim and a general lien for
the payment thereof existed pursuant to Section 32-1029 of
the Code. 19
V. BREACH OF CONTRACT
In Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Elmwood Proper-
ties,20 Elmwood, the holder of a prior mortgage, entered into
an agreement with Lawyers Title and its insured warranting
that its mortgage constituted a valid, enforceable, first lien
on the property, a portion of which was covered by the in-
sured mortgage. Elmwood further agreed to prosecute its
pending foreclosure to a "successful conclusion," specifically
defined as "a final judgment confirming the essential allega-
tions of Elmwood's complaint (in its foreclosure action),
granting the prayer therein for foreclosure of its said mort-
gage as a first lien and ordering the sale of the mortgaged
property in satisfaction of the debt."2' Upon performance
thereof, Lawyers Title agreed to purchase the prior mortgage,
the indebtedness secured thereby, and the judgment of fore-
closure. Elmwood subsequently obtained an order of foreclo-
sure; however, it provided for the sale of only a portion of
the property covered by its mortgage.
the expenses of the care and treatment, and it may contract
with any of these persons for a patient's or trainee's care and
treatment .... In arriving at the amount to be paid the Com-
mission shall have due regard for the financial condition and
estate of the patient or trainee, his present and future needs and
the present and future needs of his lawful dependents, and when-
ever considered necessary to protect him or his dependents may
agree to accept a monthly sum less than the actual per capita
cost (emphasis added).
18. 187 S.E.2d at 893.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. §32-1029 (1962) provides:
There is hereby created a general lien upon the real and per-
sonal property of any person who is receiving or who has re-
ceived care and treatment in a State mental health facility, to
the extent of the total expense to the State in providing the care,
training or treatment.
20. 187 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 1972).
21. Id. at 800.
[Vol. 24
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CONTRACTS SURVEYED
Elmwood contended on appeal that such was a "success-
ful conclusion" since the security ordered to be sold was more
than sufficient to satisfy its mortgage. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the supreme court held:
The failure to establish the Elmwood mortgage as a first lien
against the above stated portion of the property involved clearly con-
stituted a breach of the warranty given by appellants to respondents;
and, because of such fact, the lower court properly held that the judg-
ment of foreclosure and sale . ..was not a "successful conclusion"
of Elmwood's foreclosure action as defined in the agreement .... 22
VI. IMPLIED CONTRACTS
The issue presented for the court's consideration in Addy
v. Bolton 23 was whether attorney's fees are recoverable under
an implied contract of indemnity. The appellants, owners of a
store building leased to the Addys, had engaged the respon-
dent, a general contractor, to make needed repairs to the
building. The Addys instituted this action against the appel-
lants and the respondent to recover for the damage to their
merchandise resulting from a fire caused by the respondent's
welding operation. The jury returned a verdict against the
respondent only, thus exonerating the appellants from any
liability; however, the appellants prosecuted this appeal from
a verdict directed against them on their cross action against
the respondent. They contended that even though there was
no written contract between themselves and the respondent,
an implied contract of indemnity arose by operation of law,
under which they were entitled to recover the fees paid the
attorneys. The supreme court agreed, stating:
In actions of indemnity, brought where the duty to indemnify is either
implied by law or arises under contract, and no personal fault of the
indemnitee has joined in causing the injury, reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred in resisting the claim indemnified against may be recovered
as part of the damages and expenses.
2 4
Phillips Refrigeration Co. v. Commercial Credit Co.2 5 was
an appeal taken from the trial judge's grant of the defendant's
motion for a nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiff's testi-
mony. The complaint alleged an express contract by which the
22. Id. at 802.
23. 257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708 (1971).
24. Id. at 34, 183 S.E. at 710.
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plaintiff stored equipment for the defendant at a certain
monthly charge. The plaintiff's contention on appeal was that
the evidence established a quantum meruit type of lease ar-
rangement. In affirming the action of the circuit court, the
Supreme Court reiterated the proposition that a party may
not plead an express contract and recover upon an implied
contract without amendment of the complaint, which in this
case was never sought.
SIDNEY S. Rim.s, III
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss4/3
